LEGAL JOURNAL OF LAW, Year 2026 Issue 283 (Temmuz)

MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS

Merve KÜÇÜK — 2026-07-29

This article examines the military operations of the European Union from the perspective of international law, adopting a comprehensive approach that assesses the entirety of European Union military practice rather than focusing on individual operations. It first analyses the European Union as an international organization with legal personality and considers the internal legal framework of European Union law governing military operations. The study then identifies the international legal norms applicable to the European Union, with particular emphasis on the prohibition of the use of force and its recognized exceptions. Distinguishing between territorial and naval operations, the article applies the relevant legal regimes, including the law of the sea where appropriate. Each European Union military operation is examined in light of its specific legal basis, assessing whether it rests on consent, authorization, or rights arising under freedoms of the high seas. The analysis demonstrates that, with limited exceptions, European Union military operations have generally been conducted on solid international legal grounds.

SUBSIDIZING AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES AS A POSITIVE OBLIGATION OF THE STATE IN TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Cem Ümit Beyoğlu — 2026-07-29

The agricultural sector is not only a strategic sector in terms of economic production, but also in terms of social welfare, food security and environmental sustainability. In Turkey, agriculture has a critical role in providing means of livelihood for the rural population, ensuring food security and achieving social justice. Therefore, the state's positive responsibilities towards agriculture include multidimensional tasks such as regulation, planning, protection, and guidance, beyond economic support. Indeed, the 1982 Constitution imposes important obligations on the state regarding the protection and development of agricultural production and the prevention of the misuse of agricultural land. In this context, the state's positive obligations in supporting and regulating agricultural activities are of great importance in terms of a sustainable agricultural sector and the protection of the natural environment. The state has various positive obligations in the context of supporting and regulating agricultural activities. These obligations encompass the duties and authorities assigned to the state by the Constitution and relevant laws. The aim of this study is to address the issue from the perspective of concepts such as the protection, use and planning of agricultural land, the legal status of workers, agricultural insurance and urban agriculture practices.

The Scope, Limits, and Implications for Property Rights of the Error-Correction Institution under Article 41 of the Cadastral Code: An Assessment in Light of Decisions of the Court of Cassation and the Constitutional Court

Ayşegül KAYA — 2026-07-29

Article 41 of the Cadastral Code authorizes the administrative correction of measurement, demarcation, mapping, and calculation errors arising during or after cadastral surveys. However, the scope of the errors covered by this provision -particularly whether it applies to corrective procedures that alter ownership- remains contentious in both legal doctrine and case law. While the Court of Cassation has consistently held that corrections made under Article 41 may not affect the scope of real rights in immovable property, the Constitutional Court has emphasized that the right to property must be safeguarded under Article 35 of the Constitution and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. This study seeks to assess the purpose and limits of Article 41 of the Cadastral Code in light of the principle of trust in the land registry and the constitutional guarantees of the right to property. It is argued that a broad interpretation of this provision, allowing interferences that touch upon the essence of property rights, would undermine the principle of legal certainty. Accordingly, doctrinal and jurisprudential arguments are advanced in favour of a narrow interpretation of Article 41.

Digital Constitutionalism: Limiting Power and Protecting Digital Human Rights in the Digital Sphere

DEMET ÇELİK ULUSOY — 2026-07-29

Digital transformation is dismantling the state‑centric power architecture of classical constitutionalism and generating a new configuration in which both public and private digital actors must be simultaneously constrained. This article conceptualises digital constitutionalism as a normative framework that transposes the principles of the rule of law, representation and effective remedy to the digital sphere and encompasses the de facto power of “online gatekeeper” platforms; on this basis, it examines the method and the normative necessity of recognising digital human rights. The study frames digital human rights in a two‑layered structure: (i) the reinterpretation of established rights such as freedom of expression and communication, the right to privacy and the right to data protection in the online environment through proportionality and balancing; and (ii) the normative justification and institutional safeguarding of digital‑specific claims, including the right to internet access, digital privacy, the right to be forgotten/de‑indexed, the right to disconnect, protection against cyber‑threats and algorithmic transparency. Starting from informational constitutionalism, it analyses constitutive constitutionalism, the horizontal effect of fundamental rights and internet bills of rights and argues that the main EU instruments adopted in recent years (e.g. GDPR, DSA and DMA) amount to an emerging digital constitutional regime that constrains platform power through duties of transparency, reason‑giving, risk assessment and independent oversight. In the Turkish context, an examination of the core legal framework governing the digital sphere, higher court jurisprudence and international indicators reveals a regulatory landscape primarily oriented towards security and administrative control, and markedly weak in rights‑based procedural safeguards. The article concludes that digital constitutionalism is not merely a conceptual option for Türkiye but a precondition for preserving the legitimacy of constitutional democracy in the digital age, and that the explicit recognition of digital human rights, enforceable both against the state and powerful private platforms, has become a normative imperative.

Sharenting and Parental Criminal Liability: An Analysis under Article 233 of the Turkish Penal Code

Şevkiye Berfin IŞIK YILMAZ — 2026-07-29

In the digital age, parents’ sharing of their children’s personal data on social media platforms has become a widespread parenting practice commonly referred to as sharenting in the literature. Although such practices are often perceived as well-intentioned forms of parental expression or everyday sharing, they may generate long-term risks for children’s privacy, dignity, psychosocial development, and digital identity. This article examines sharenting practices within the framework of the offence of violation of family law obligations under Article 233 of the Turkish Penal Code, with a particular focus on the limits of parental criminal liability.

The study argues that parental duties of care, education, and protection arising from family law cannot be interpreted as confined solely to the physical or material sphere in the digital era. As digital environments have become an integral part of children’s social existence and identity formation, parents’ obligation to protect their children against digital risks should be understood as a contemporary manifestation of their duties of care and education. Within this framework, the article analyzes the conditions under which sharenting practices may constitute a breach of care and education obligations under Article 233(1) of the Turkish Penal Code, as well as the circumstances in which such practices may escalate into forms of neglect that fall within the scope of Article 233(3), where a child’s morality, safety, or health is seriously endangered.

The study does not endorse an approach that treats sharenting practices as automatically giving rise to criminal liability. On the contrary, while preserving the ultima ratio character of criminal law, it emphasizes that criminal responsibility should arise only in situations where the child’s best interests are clearly compromised—particularly where sharing practices become systematic, dignity-violating, or pose serious threats to the child’s psychosocial integrity.

Ultimately, this article aims to offer a balanced analytical framework that does not subsume sharenting practices wholesale under criminal law, yet renders visible the distinctive forms of neglect emerging in the digital age. By centering the best interests of the child and positioning criminal law as a complementary element within a multi-layered child protection regime, the study seeks to contribute to a more nuanced and rights-based legal assessment of parental digital sharing practices.